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ABSTRACT
Using a unique 3-digit firm-level data set of all medium and large manufacturing
enterprises in Bulgaria covering the years 1997-1998, we investigate how wages are
affected by ownership status, firm size and rent sharing. Our pooled OLS, panel and
first-difference TSLS estimates clearly point to ownership structure as an important
determinant of both the wage level (for given productivity) and the degree of rent
sharing. Rent sharing is very pronounced in state-owned firms but far less
pronounced in private domestic and foreign firms. The results strongly confirm the
existence of a multinational wage premium. In addition, we find weak evidence of a
positive firm size-wage effect and a positive effect of firm size on the degree of rent
sharing. If these effects exist, they are often more pronounced in private domestic
firms.
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1.    INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on wage determination in Bulgaria and contributes to three topics in the
empirical labour economics literature. The first topic concerns rent sharing. In a prominent attack
on traditional analysis, Sumner Slichter (1950) showed that wages in the US manufacturing sector
appeared to be positively correlated with various measures of firms’ ability-to-pay. In the spirit of
Slichter, labour economists have devoted much effort to test for imperfect competition in labour
markets in the US and Canada1 and in Western Europe.2 The few related firm-level studies for post-
communist Europe compare mainly rent-sharing behaviour before and during the transition period
(Basu et al., 1997a [Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republic]; Basu et al., 1997b [Poland];
Grosfeld and Nivet, 1997 [Poland]). These studies indicate that, except in Poland and to a lesser
extent in the Slovak Republic, wages were set relatively independently of firms’ performance under
communism. During the transition period, however, wages started to vary with sales per worker,
suggesting the presence of rent sharing. Commander and Dhar (1998) and Köllö (1997) investigate
respectively for Poland and Hungary whether rent-sharing behaviour differs between firms with
increasing and decreasing real sales.
Besides adding Bulgaria to the list of country studies,3 we contribute to this literature by
allowing the rent-sharing coefficient to vary across firms. More specifically, we investigate
whether labour market imperfections differ between (1) state, private domestic and foreign
companies and (2) small and large firms. In contrast to Grosfeld and Nivet, 1999 [Poland] and
Luke and Schaffer, 1999 [Russia], our analysis draws upon a unique representative panel of firms
in manufacturing with detailed information on output and input factors and on firm ownership for
the period 1997-1998.
The positive relationship between wages and firm size is another well-documented empirical
regularity. In their seminal paper, Brown and Medoff (1989) found a significant positive firm size-
wage effect in the US. This effect has also shown up in more recent studies in the US (see Oi and
Idson, 1999 for a review of the literature) as well as in other (mostly West European) countries.4
Testing the firm size-wage hypothesis in post-communist countries has remained a largely
unexplored field. Post-communist countries provide, however, certain advantages since firm size
                                                          
1 Among them are Abowd and Lemieux, 1993; Blanchflower et al., 1996; Budd and Slaughter, 2003; Christofides et al., 1992; Currie
and McConnell, 1992.
2 e.g. Abowd and Allain, 1996 [France]; Abowd et al., 1999 [France]; Blanchflower et al., 1989 [UK]; Budd et al., 2003 [West and East
European Countries]; Goos and Konings, 2001 [Belgium]; Hildreth and Oswald, 1997 [UK]; Lever and Marquering, 1996 [the
Netherlands]; Margolis and Salvanes, 2001 [France and Norway]; Nickell and Kong, 1992 [UK]; Nickell and Wadhwani, 1990 [UK];
Piekkola and Kauhanen, 2003 [Finland]; Teulings and Hartog, 1998 [the Nordic countries and Germany].
3 Note that Jones and Kato (1996) provide evidence that the compensation of chief executives in Bulgarian not fully state-owned firms is
positively related to labour productivity.
4 e.g. Australia (Meagher and Wilson, 2000), Austria (Oosterbeek and van Praag, 1995), Canada (Morrisette, 1993), France (Abowd et
al., 1999), Germany (Criscuolo, 2000; Schmidt and Zimmerman, 1991; Winter-Ebmer, 1995), Italy (Loveman and Sengenberger, 1991),
Japan (Idson and Ishii, 1993; Rebick, 1993), Sweden (Edin and Zetterberg, 1992), UK (Main and Reilly, 1993).
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can be considered largely exogenous to productivity in these countries (Svejnar, 1999). The reason
is that at the onset of transition firm size was mostly politically determined by the central planners.
To our knowledge, only one study investigates explicitly the firm size-wage effect in a post-
communist country, Russia (Idson, 2000). Our analysis goes one step further as we test additionally
whether the firm size-wage effect depends on the ownership structure of the firm.
A third empirical issue is the impact of foreign ownership on the firm’s wage policy. In the
literature on multinational enterprises, it is a stylised fact that foreign firms pay on average higher
wages than their domestic counterparts, even controlling for a wide range of worker and/or firm
characteristics.5 In transition countries, newly established private firms pay higher wages than other
firms (Svejnar, 1999). Previous studies investigating ownership effects on wages in these countries
had to rely on ownership dummy variables (Earle et al., 1995 [Russia], Grosfeld and Nivet, 1999
[Poland], Jones and Kato, 1996 [Bulgaria] and Luke and Schaffer, 1999 [Russia]). Having data on
the fraction of shares held by state, private domestic and foreign owners, we can investigate the
ownership-wage effect in more detail.
In the remainder, we first discuss the institutional context of wage determination in Bulgaria
during the transition period. In section 3 we set out the theoretical framework. Section 4 describes
the empirical setting whereas section 5 presents the data set. Section 6 confronts the hypotheses
with Bulgarian firm-level data and reports some robustness checks. Section 7 summarises and
interprets the results. Our main conclusions are that rent sharing is very pronounced in state-owned
firms but far less pronounced in private domestic and foreign firms. The results strongly confirm
the existence of a multinational wage premium. In addition, we find weak evidence of a positive
firm size-wage effect and a positive effect of firm size on the degree of rent sharing. If these effects
exist, they are often more pronounced in private domestic firms.
2.    INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Under central planning, collective bargaining was absent and wage levels and structures
were determined by central planning authorities without union input. Trade unions acted merely as
workplace representatives of the Communist Party in state-owned enterprises (Flanagan, 1998).
In Bulgaria, the transformation of industrial relations started in 1989-1990. To establish
industrial relations in line with the European standards, an institutional and legislative framework
                                                          
5 See e.g. Dale-Olsen, 2002 [Norway]; Doms and Jensen, 1998 [US]; Feliciano and Lipsey, 1999 [US]; Globerman et al., 1994 [Canada];
Howenstine and Zeile, 1994 [US]; Lipsey, 1994 [US] and Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2001 [Indonesia]. For a survey of the literature on
foreign firms in Mexico, Venezuela and the US, see Aitken et al., 1996.
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was laid down in the Labour Code in 1993. The Labour Code is based on two fundamental
principles: tripartite dialogue among social partners, i.e. social dialogue among governments,
reformed and alternative unions and employer organisations, and independence of the social actors
(Beleva et al., 1999). In line with the requirements of the Labour Code, the National Council for
Tripartite Cooperation emerged in Bulgaria at the beginning of 1993. Only those trade unions and
employer organisations which passed the criteria of representation established by law could
participate in the social dialogue (Iankova, 1998). Once recognised by the government, the
representative status was automatically transferred to the lower organisational levels (see infra).
Until 1998, four employer organisations and six trade unions participated in tripartite negotiations.
On the employer side, the Bulgarian Industrial Association (BIA), the Chamber for Trade and
Industry, the Union for Private Enterprising and the Union Revival covered the criteria for national
representation. During the 1990s, the Bulgarian Industrial Association played the most important
role in the social dialogue (Gradev, 2000). On the employee side, the most powerful syndicates
were Prodkrepa Confederation of Labour and the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions
(CITUB) (Beleva et al., 1999). Although union membership declined sharply in all Central and
East European Countries, union membership in Bulgaria is significantly higher than in most other
CEE countries. Estimates of union membership amount to more than 70 percent of total
employment in Bulgaria compared to only 20 percent in other CEE economies (IMF, 2001;
Worldbank, 2001).
The development of tripartism has led to a multi-level bargaining structure in Bulgaria
(Iankova, 1998). Negotiations are carried out on four independent levels: the national, branch,
regional and enterprise level. The branch and regional levels are not well developed. Basic issues
of working conditions, unemployment insurance and the minimum wage, as well as the initial level
of average wages in the public sector, are negotiated at the national level. Similar issues with local
importance are subject to agreements at branch and regional levels. All specific parameters
concerning wages, employment, job evaluation and the level of additional payments are bargained
at the enterprise level (Beleva et al., 1999).
In many countries union influence at the enterprise level is limited. Wages are generally
determined unilaterally by management. As mentioned above, union power is relatively large and
wage determination occurs through bargaining in Bulgaria (Martin and Cristescu-Martin, 1999).
This institutional feature motivates our choice of Bulgaria for analysing wage determination at the
firm level.
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3.    THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In accordance with the wage determination system applicable to Bulgaria, wages are
considered to be the result of bargaining between the union6 and the firm represented by its
manager. To this end, we rely on the Right-To-Manage model (Nickell and Andrews, 1983). Under
the assumption that union members are risk neutral and -given our short-run focus- that
employment is not an argument in the union’s utility function, the real wage w  is assumed to result
from the maximisation of the following Nash-bargaining maximand:
   
1w-A Y-wN=   (1)
with A  the workers’ outside option expressed in real terms, Y  real value added, N  the
employment level and Y- N =w π  real profits. The bargaining strength of employees, i.e. insider
power, is represented by  .
Maximisation of this function with respect to the wage rate gives the following first-order
condition:
1
= A+
N
πw 
 
(2)
According to this model, real firm-level wages are affected by both internal conditions (represented
by profits per employee) and external factors (taken up by the outside option or the alternative
wage) and the bargaining power of employees.
In the empirical part, we use value added to capture the firm’s ability-to-pay. Our motivation
is that although profits per worker have the advantage that they control for all costs, they have the
disadvantage that they are negatively related to wages by construction, hence creating a severe
endogeneity bias. Switching to value added per employee eliminates the direct endogeneity
problem.7
                                                          
6 Although worker influence on enterprise policies may occur through trade unions, works councils and employee ownership, in Bulgaria
worker participation is largely exercised through trade unions (Flanagan, 1998).
7 This does not imply, however, that endogeneity is not an issue anymore. For example, wage shocks affecting productivity may cause
endogeneity problems when using real value added per employee.
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By adding the term 
1

 
w  to both sides of equation (2), we obtain an expression for the
optimum wage as a function of real value added per worker:8
 1
Y
A
N
w         (3)
Although a well-developed theory of the determinants of bargaining power is lacking, some
authors have made   heterogeneous. Bughin (1991), Svejnar (1986) and Veugelers (1989) link the
firm-level or sectoral bargaining power parameter to meso- or macroeconomic variables like the
consumer price index, sectoral unemployment rates and proxies for product market concentration.
Others consider firm-specific variables like the elasticity of labour supply at the level of the firm,
firm size, risk of bankruptcy and technology level as important determinants of rent sharing (e.g.
Piekkola and Kauhanen, 2003). The focus in this paper is on the potential influence of ownership
status and firm size on the employees’ bargaining power and the degree of rent sharing. Depending
on these structural variables, we presume that different relative weights will be given to the
workers’ interests and to profitability considerations. We adopt a straightforward specification:
 0 own N own*Nγ γ OWN +γ N +γ OWN*N= +    (4)
In this equation OWN  refers to the ownership status of the firm: state-owned, private
domestic or foreign. Firm size is measured by the firm’s employment level ( N ).
Substituting (4) into (3), we obtain the following basic equation for bargained real wages:
      
              
0 own N own*N *
Y Y Y Y
A OWN A N A OWN N A
N N N N
= A+γ - - + γ - γ -w γ + (5)
                                                          
8 In the empirical section, all real variables are deflated by the (exogenous) producer price (
P
P ). The real wage w  will be the real
product wage. It could be argued that workers bargain over different wages. Workers’ utility is affected by wages deflated by the
(exogenous) consumer price index ( cP ). Algebraically, equation (1) would be    
1-
' Y-wN= wκ-Aκ   with w  the real product
wage and P
c
P
P
κ= . Since the effect of κ  on the maximand is multiplicative, the bargained real wage ( w ) in equation (3) is unaffected.
Assuming risk-averse workers does not change that result for a large range of utility functions.
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4.    EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES
4.1.    Empirical Framework
In this section we test the model described by equation (5) using panel data for 1514
Bulgarian firms during the period 1997-1998. Equation (6) reflects this panel data set-up. Note that
in this equation we explicitly model the effect of the three possible ownership categories mentioned
before. Furthermore, for generality and in line with the literature, we have extended equation (5) by
allowing for an intercept term (α ) that can also differ according to ownership status and firm size.9
A final element of flexibility is the coefficient on A  (as a separate variable). Rather than imposing
1, we estimate this coefficient freely ( δ ). We justify this choice below.
           
 
it 0 privd it for it N it privd*N it it for*N it it t
0 it t privd it it t for it it t
N it it t privd*N it it it
PRIVD FOR PRIVD FOR
PRIVD FOR
PRIVD
valad_N valad_N valad_N
valad_N valad_N
=α +α +α +α N α N α N δA +
        γ A +γ A +γ A +
        γ N A γ N
w + + +
- - -
- + -   t for*N it it it t i itFOR valad_N D97A +γ N A +α + +ε
        
-
 (6)
where subscript i  is used to index observations on individual firms and t  represents year.
The dependent variable is the annual real wage per worker. Among the explanatory
variables, valad_N  stands for real value added per worker and N  for employment. To check
robustness, we will later use real profits per worker as a proxy for internal conditions. The variables
PRIVD  and FOR  are ownership categories. They refer to the fraction of shares held by private
domestic and foreign owners. The ownership category that is left out is the state, which refers to
the fraction of shares in the firm held by the state, municipalities or Treasury.
To stick as close as possible to the theory, the workers’ outside option ( A ) is proxied by its
expected value: the regional probability of employment times the real average regional wage.10
Controlling for region-specific variables is in the context of Bulgaria particularly important as there
are considerable disparities between the regions in which the firms are located (UNDP, 2000).
Obviously, assuming our proxy to equal the theoretical A  is rather strong. Allowing some
flexibility in the coefficient on tA  ( δ ) is therefore justified.11   represents a white noise error term.
                                                          
9 Note that excluding firm size in the intercept term of the wage equation would bias the estimate of the rent sharing effect.
10 Ideally, the proxy for A  would be: (regional probability of unemployment * unemployment benefits) + (regional probability of
employment * real average regional wage). Since the level of unemployment benefits is determined at the national level (IMF, 2001),
however, there is no variation between firms. Therefore, we proxy A  by regional probability of employment * real average regional
wage.
11 Note however that we do not allow flexibility in the variable ( valad_N A- ). The reason is that we can not impose proportional
restrictions in STATA. From the estimates, it follows that the coefficient on A  is 0.7 on average. As a test, we have therefore created
the variable ( valad_N 0.7*A- ) and re-estimated the model. The results were broadly similar to those reported in the paper.
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All specifications include a year dummy ( D97 ) to capture possible unobservable aggregate shocks
in 1997. Finally, we control for unobserved firm heterogeneity by including a firm-level fixed
effect ( iα ), even within the separate ownership groups.
The heterogeneity that we have introduced in the wage intercept and the rent sharing
parameter affects the interpretation of the coefficients in equation (6). 0 Nα + α N  is the wage
intercept in state-owned firms whereas 0 N privd privd*Nα + α N + α α N+  and 0 N for for*Nα + α N + α α N+
indicate the wage intercept in private domestic and foreign firms respectively. Likewise, 0 Nγ γ N+ 
reflects the degree of rent sharing in state firms while 0 N privd privd*Nγ + γ N + γ γ N+  and
0 N for for*Nγ  + γ N + γ γ N+  indicate the degree of rent sharing in private domestic and foreign firms
respectively.
We specify the variables in equation (6) in levels rather than logs for two reasons. First, the
levels-levels specification is the most consistent with the theoretical model (equations (2) and (3)).
Second, given the presence of loss-making firms in our data, the use of logs would have
necessitated discarding observations from poorly performing firms. This would possibly introduce
problems of selection bias.
4.2.     Testable Hypotheses
In the literature, various explanations have been put forward for the wage differential
between foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms. Strand (2002) refers to the fact that foreign
firms try to attract a higher quality work force and to differences in labour turnover costs. Jensen
and Meckling (1976) point to efficiency wage mechanisms. Other authors explain the wage
differential by differences in firm size and technological superiority (Aitken and Harrison, 1999;
Djankov and Hoekman, 1998). A very recent explanation for the multinational wage premium is
international rent sharing (Budd and Slaughter, 2003; Budd et al., 2003). The idea is that profits
within multinational firms are shared across borders. Our data do not allow an explicit test of these
explanations. However, we believe that technological superiority and international rent sharing are
two potential explanations for finding a multinational wage differential in Bulgaria. Therefore we
expect for privdα >α .
Explanations for the positive relationship between firm size and wages build on different
aspects of wage formation: labour quality (Hammermesh, 1980; Kremer, 1993; Weiss and Landau,
1984), compensating differentials (Masters, 1969), efficiency wages (Oi, 1983; Garen, 1985) or
more generally firm-specific compensation policies (Bullow and Summers, 1976), internal labour
OWNERSHIP, FIRM SIZE AND RENT SHARING IN BULGARIA                                                                                              9
markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971), union avoidance and union demand (Weiss, 1966), job
seniority (Schmidt and Zimmerman, 1991) and rent sharing. Based on the literature, we expect Nα
to be significantly positive. We also investigate whether the firm size-wage effect differs according
to ownership status. A priori, no clear prediction can be made about the magnitude of the firm size
effect in the different ownership categories ( privd*Nα  and for*Nα ), however.
In the labour literature, the standard explanation for rent sharing is insurance, i.e. implicit
risk sharing between firms and workers. Hence, we anticipate an upward responsiveness of real
firm-level wages to rents per worker. At the same time, we expect the insider effect to be
determined by ownership form and/or firm size. Intuitively, we expect to find a strong rent-sharing
effect in state firms and a small one in foreign firms. The idea is that foreign firms, being much
more efficient than state firms, are concentrated in sectors with high value added. In contrast, value
added in state-owned firms is much lower. Therefore, workers in state firms need to capture a large
part of the rents to secure an acceptable wage while the opposite is true for workers in foreign
firms. Moreover, employees in foreign firms are able to appropriate some portion of the rents from
their parent firms (international rent sharing) which is translated into a higher inside wage level.
Therefore, we expect 0for privd< <γ γ .  In addition, the bargaining strength of the employees is
expected to be positively correlated with firm size, i.e. N γ  is expected to be positive. Whether this
effect is different in private domestic and foreign firms than in state-owned firms ( privd*Nγ  and
for*Nγ ) is ex ante unclear, however.
5.    DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
We use a panel of 1514 manufacturing firms from the 28 Bulgarian regions (‘oblasti’). To be
included in the data set at least one of the following conditions has to be satisfied. Either total
assets or total sales exceed 8 and 16 million USD respectively, or the number of employees is
larger than 100.
All variables are taken from published annual company accounts which are collected by
“Bureau Van Dyck” and marketed as the Amadeus data set. Nominal variables are expressed in
millions of leva.12 Although the data cover the period 1994-1998, we will focus the analysis on the
period 1997-1998 as only for these two years detailed information on the ownership structure of the
firms is available.
This unique data set allows us to make at least two major contributions. First, until now the
scarce existing empirical work in this field typically had to rely on small samples of firms collected
                                                          
12 In 1997 the exchange rate (annual average) was 1.674 leva per USD (EBRD, 2000).
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through surveys. In contrast, our sample contains virtually the entire population of medium and
large firms in manufacturing. Comparing the employment and sales coverage of our data with total
employment and sales in manufacturing reported in the statistical yearbooks, reveals that our data
cover 82% of total sales and 66% of total employment in manufacturing.13 Furthermore, the
Amadeus data set is collected from company accounts at the three-digit level of sectoral
disaggregation. To our knowledge, this kind of detailed firm-level data for a transition country has
not been used before for this purpose.
A second strength of the data set is that it offers detailed information on the ownership
structure of firms for two consecutive years. In particular, we know the fraction of shares held by
the state and by private investors and can observe their evolution over time. Next, we are able to
make a distinction between private domestic investors and foreign investors. Earlier studies for
Central and Eastern Europe had to rely on ownership dummies to investigate the crucial question of
how wage formation is related to form of ownership (Earle et al., 1995, Grosfeld and Nivet, 1999,
Jones and Kato, 1996 and Luke and Schaffer, 1999). Detailed information on the shareholding
structure also enables us to perform some additional robustness checks. Table 1 shows the
distribution of ownership on average.
Table 1   Distribution of Ownership
1997 1998
Mean (St.Dev.) Mean (St.Dev.)
Fraction of shares held by the state (STATE)          0.34 (0.38)             0.27 (0.35)
Fraction of STATE  firms in total number of firmsa          0.70             0.66
Fraction of STATE in all STATE  firms          0.49 (0.36)             0.40 (0.35)
Fraction of shares held by private domestic owners (PRIVD)          0.62 (0.39)             0.68 (0.37)
Fraction of PRIVD firms in total number of firmsb          0.79             0.83
Fraction of PRIVD in all PRIVD  firms          0.78 (0.26)             0.82 (0.23)
Fraction of shares held by foreign owners (FOR)          0.04 (0.17)             0.05 (0.19)
Fraction of FOR firms in total number of firmsc          0.06             0.08
Fraction of FOR in all FOR firms          0.68 (0.23)             0.63 (0.29)
Number of majority state firms          332             269
Number of majority private domestic firms          897             1150
Number of majority foreign firms          63             83
Source: Amadeus Database
a: STATE firms are firms for which STATE > 0.
b: PRIVD firms are firms for which PRIVD > 0.
c: FOR firms are firms for which FOR > 0.
In 1997 the fraction of shares held by foreign owners was only 4% on average, meaning that
only a relatively small fraction of firms had some foreign participation. However, if we look at
shareholding in foreign firms only, i.e. firms with at least some shares held by foreign owners, we
                                                          
13 Sales coverage ratio = total sales of firms in Amadeus in 1998 divided by total national sales as reported by the National Statistical
Offices. Idem for employment.
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can see that the low average share of foreign ownership hides the fact that foreign investors were
concentrated in a few firms. For example, in 1998 119 firms had a foreign owner who held an
average share of 63%. In 83 firms foreign owners were holding more than 50% of the shares.
Hence, in most cases foreign investors owned a majority share. Looking at shareholding in private
domestic firms only reveals that private domestic investors held on average 80% of total shares.
Finally, we can observe that the fraction of private domestic and foreign firms in the total number
of firms increased over time.14 During the 1990s, the inflow of foreign direct investment rose
rapidly. By 1998 inward FDI was almost 10 times higher than in 1991 (EBRD, 2000). The rising
total number of firms reflects a better coverage in the latest year and indicates that our analysis
draws upon an unbalanced panel.
The regional variable tA  (at the NUTS3-regional level) is collected from the National
Statistical Institute (NSI, 1998; 1999) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP,
2000). Table 2 reports summary statistics for the main variables used in the regression analysis.
Table 2   Summary Statistics
VARIABLES 1997 1998 1997-1998
# Obs. Mean St. Dev. # Obs. Mean St. Dev. # Obs. Mean St. Dev.
Employment  (N) 1306 374.12 759.47 1381 348.03 693.74 2687 360.71 726.41
Average wage (w) 1043 98.62 101.86 1109 112.22 76.55 2152 105.63 89.95
Alternative wage (A) 1514 83.22 18.32 1514 93.92 16.77 3028 88.57 18.35
Profits per employee (prof_N) 1038 178.08 601.59 1106 303.45 3277.26 2144 242.75 2391.06
N * prof_N 1038 81070.1 453430.5 1112 59549.7 352974.7 2150 69939.5 404647.2
Value added per employee (valad_N) 1038 277.09 663.89 1108 415.98 3279.45 2146 348.80 2401.73
valad_N -  A 1038 192.95 661.23 1108 321.51 3278.29 2146 259.33 2400.41
N * (valad_N -  A) 1038 99075.6 537981.3 1108 80076.9 431478.2 2146 89266.4 485894.2
Source: Amadeus Database, NSI (1998, 1999), UNDP (1999)
Wages are constructed as the reported wage bill divided by the average number of
employees, which is standard for corporate data in the rent sharing literature (e.g. Hildreth and
Oswald, 1997). The wage bill includes wage and salary payments to employees as well as
mandated employer contributions to government social insurance funds.15 Annual wages are
expressed as real wages per worker, i.e. nominal wages deflated by a three-digit producer price
index, normalised to 1 in 1995. This price index is obtained from the central statistical offices. ‘ A ’
represents the conditions on the labour market, measured as the regional probability of employment
times the real average regional wage. Profits and value added per worker are also expressed in real
terms. They are constructed in the standard way. Value added is calculated as sales minus material
                                                          
14 Note that the sum of the fractions of respectively state, private domestic and foreign firms in the total number of firms does not add up
to 1 as each firm can have multiple owners.
15 The wage measure hence refers to paid wages. Wage arrears could bias the rent sharing effect. To our knowledge, however, the
problem of wage arrears is a very important issue in Russia and Ukraine but less severe in Bulgaria (Alfandari and Schaffer, 1996; Earle
and Sabirianova, 2001; Ivanova and Wyplosz, 1999; Lehmann et al., 1999).
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costs and profits as value added minus the wage bill (see e.g. Blanchflower et al., 1996). Our profit
measure hence corresponds to the economic concept of rents available for sharing with workers.
Variables per worker are constructed by dividing by the average number of employees in each firm
for each year respectively. Employment ranges from 6 to 16280 employees. Its average level is
361. From Table 2, it is clear that profits as well as value added vary much more than wages.
Table A.1 in Appendix presents summary statistics by ownership category. In this table firms
are classified according to majority shareholding. The average employment level is the highest in
majority foreign firms (652), followed by majority state firms (441) and the lowest in majority
private domestic firms (331) (see lower part of Table A.1). Workers in majority foreign firms get
the highest wages (mean wage of 153). Wages in majority state and majority private domestic
companies are much lower (mean wage of 100 and 106 respectively).
Privatisation is clearly associated with better firm performance. Majority private firms
outperform majority state firms. Furthermore, majority foreign firms outperform majority state
firms as well as majority private domestic firms. Using the same data set, recent empirical research
by Estrin et al. (2001) confirms these findings. Strikingly, 18% of majority state companies (87 out
of 476) are classified as loss-making firms, reporting negative profits per employee over the sample
period.
6.    RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
6.1.    Estimation Method
Our estimation strategy consists of three parts. First, in order to get some grip on the more
long-term relationships of the model, the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares estimator is used as a
benchmark for cross-sectional time-series estimates. Second, the Panel Data Estimation Method
allows us to control for firm-specific heterogeneity which may capture various unobservables, such
as the quality of capital and labour. In the last part, we check the robustness of the fixed-effects
estimator. In addition, we try to deal with two problems that have not been addressed so far. First,
simultaneity may obscure the true relationship between wages and the variables reflecting internal
conditions. Moreover, firm size will be endogenous in that any effect from size to wages will
induce the firm to economise on labour. Second, the level of employment entering both the
definition of the wage and the measure of rents per worker, raises the standard problem that
measurement error may induce spurious correlation between these two key variables. To
circumvent these problems, we use the First-difference Instrumental Variables Method suggested
for dynamic fixed-effects models by Anderson and Hsiao (1982). Under the assumption that
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endogeneity is constant across years, these results are expected to be in line with those obtained by
the fixed-effects estimator.
6.2.    Results
We use the pooled OLS, panel and first-difference TSLS method to estimate four alternative
specifications of equation (6). Gradually, we loosen a number of restrictions. In the first
specification it is imposed that only ownership status matters for the wage intercept and the degree
of rent sharing. Firm size does not, i.e. N privd*N for*N N privd*N for*N0 α = α = α = = γ = γ = γ . The second
specification relaxes the restriction that N N privd*N for*N 0 α = γ = γ = γ =  whereas in the third
specification we drop the restriction that N privd*N for*N N 0. α = α = α = γ =  In the final specification all
coefficients are freely estimated. As noted above, the benchmark ownership type is state-owned
firms.
The pooled OLS results using real value added per worker to capture the firm’s good fortune
are reported in the left part of Table 3. Consider first ownership-, size- and cross-effects on the
wage intercept, i.e. the effects on inside wages for given rent sharing. Even after controlling for
differences in firm size, private domestic and foreign ownership exerts a significantly positive
effect on the wage intercept in all specifications. In accordance with the MNE-literature and our
first hypothesis, foreign firms pay the highest wages ( for privd 0α >α > ). Furthermore, we find a
significantly positive relationship between firm size and wages in specification 2 ( N 0α > ),
confirming our second hypothesis and the findings of Idson (2000) for Russia. There is also
evidence that the firm size-wage effect differs according to ownership structure. From specification
3, it follows that the combined effect of private domestic as well as foreign ownership and firm size
is significantly positive. Concentrating on privately-owned firms the larger the firm, the higher the
wages. Once the positive combined effect of private ownership and firm size on rent sharing is also
taken into account, however, the effects on the wage intercept are less clear.
Focusing on the degree of rent sharing, the results clearly indicate that ownership status is a
crucial determinant of insider power. Each of the four specifications shows that workers in state-
owned firms succeed in appropriating a significant part of the rents ( 0γ is about 0.12). In contrast,
the employees’ capacity to capture productivity gains is very low in both private domestic
( 0 privdγ + γ ) and foreign firms ( 0 forγ + γ ). These results confirm our third hypothesis. Moreover, the
results regarding state-owned and private domestic firms are in line with the existing empirical
research for Poland (period 1992-1994) and Russia (1996-1997) in this field (Grosfeld and Nivet,
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1999; Luke and Schaffer, 1999). Both these studies use ownership dummies to discriminate
between state, privatised and commercialised enterprises and find that the share of rents taken by
workers in privatised companies is significantly less than the share taken by employees in state-
owned firms. From specification 3, it is clear that workers’ bargaining power is positively
correlated with firm size ( 0Nγ  ). This effect is highly pronounced in private domestic and foreign
firms as indicated by the significantly positive combined effect of private domestic and foreign
ownership and firm size. Finally, the estimates show that outside forces play an important role in
the wage determination process ( δ  is about 0.65).
Table 3   Wage Equation 1997-1998, dependent variable wage it  - Pooled OLS
Constant 22.869
**
(11.168)
28.734***
(10.599)
28.653***
(10.878)
0.054
(14.422) Constant
23.810**
(11.430)
26.940***
(10.968)
27.202***
(11.187)
26.458**
(11.013)
PRIVD 20.400
***
(5.315)
12.663***
(5.070)
8.693*
(5.551)
17.906***
(5.504) PRIVD
16.914***
(5.445)
11.085**
(5.257)
6.054
(5.739)
11.259**
(5.689)
FOR 74.432
***
(11.458)
60.705***
(11.346)
50.439***
(14.835)
60.435***
(14.601) FOR
73.489***
(11.662)
64.097***
(11.547)
49.997***
(15.227)
55.473***
(15.087)
N 0.009
***
(0.003)
-0.011***
(0.004)
0.019***
(0.005) N
0.016***
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.004)
0.016***
(0.005)
PRIVD * N 0.033
***
(0.007)
-0.020***
(0.008) PRIVD * N
0.034***
(0.007)
-0.001
(0.008)
FOR * N 0.030
**
(0.015)
-0.004
(0.018) FOR * N
0.030**
(0.015)
0.015
(0.018)
A 0.705
***
(0.108)
0.620***
(0.103)
0.670***
(0.105)
0.615***
(0.103) A
0.738***
(0.111)
0.653***
(0.106)
0.703***
(0.108)
0.658***
(0.107)
valad_N - A 0.128
***
(0.010)
0.126***
(0.010)
0.105***
(0.010)
0.129***
(0.010) prof_N
0.098***
(0.011)
0.099***
(0.011)
0.079***
(0.011)
0.099***
(0.011)
PRIVD *
(valad_N - A)
-0.124***
(0.010)
-0.124***
(0.010)
-0.102***
(0.010)
-0.126***
(0.010) PRIVD * prof_N
-0.095***
(0.011)
-0.098***
(0.011)
-0.077***
(0.011)
-0.098***
(0.011)
FOR *
(valad_N - A)
-0.118***
(0.011)
-0.120***
(0.011)
-0.100***
(0.011)
-0.123***
(0.012) FOR * prof_N
-0.092***
(0.013)
-0.093***
(0.013)
-0.076***
(0.012)
-0.091***
(0.013)
N * (valad_N - A) -0.00003
***
(0.00001)
0.00004***
(0.00001)
-0.00004***
(0.00001) N * prof_N
-0.00004***
(0.00001)
0.00003***
(0.00001)
-0.00004***
(0.00001)
PRIVD * N *
(valad_N - A)
0.0001***
(0.00001)
0.0002***
(0.00002)
PRIVD * N *
prof_N
0.0001***
(0.00001)
0.0001***
(0.00002)
FOR * N *
(valad_N - A)
0.0001***
(0.00002)
0.0001***
(0.00002) FOR * N * prof_N
0.00004**
(0.00002)
0.00003
(0.00003)
Year 1997 -1.841(3.971)
-2.505
(3.752)
-2.758
(3.839)
-2.638
(3.754) Year 1997
-1.408
(4.064)
-2.463
(3.885)
-2.481
(3.951)
-2.283
(3.893)
# Obs. 2040 2040 2040 2040 # Obs. 2040 2040 2040 2040
2R 0.132 0.229 0.193 0.231 2R 0.091 0.173 0.146 0.174
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%.  Standard errors in parentheses.
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The panel estimates are reported in the left part of Table 4. We control for firm heterogeneity
for each individual firm, even within the different ownership categories. In all specifications, the
Hausman test indicates that we should rely on the fixed-effects model.16
Since unobserved fixed effects, of which the unobserved quality of workers is probably an
important one, are likely to be positively correlated with private ownership, we are implicitly
controlling for one of the potential sources of endogeneity of ownership by using the fixed-effects
estimator (Estrin et al., 2001). In line with the previous results, private ownership is positively
correlated with the wage intercept although this effect is not always statistically significant for
private domestic firms. Foreign firms pay the highest wages. The results also point to a
significantly positive firm size-wage effect in private domestic firms, even after controlling for the
cross-effect on rent sharing.
With respect to rent sharing, we find again that employees in state-owned firms manage to
cream off a significantly larger share of the rents than workers in private domestic and foreign
companies, although this share is smaller than in the pooled OLS estimates. Foreign-owned firms
are in fact characterised by zero rent sharing. On average, the bargaining power of workers in large
firms is higher than in small firms. Specification 2 suggests that this effect is only significant in
private domestic firms. From specification 4, however, it follows that the cross-effect on rent
sharing is not statistically significant. This would suggest that the positive effect of firm size on the
degree of rent sharing does not differ according to ownership status. Again, external labour market
conditions appear to be important for wage setting.
                                                          
16 A critique to the use of within-group estimation is that the assumption of non-zero correlation between the time-invariant fixed effect
and the exogenous variables does not allow for doing out-of sample inference (Baltagi, 1995). Since we rely on a large and
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Table 4   Wage Equation 1997-1998, dependent variable wage it  - Panel (Fixed Effects)
Constant 23.123(17.216)
27.691
(18.123)
30.107*
(18.319)
31.641*
(18.345) Constant
27.345*
(17.401)
26.923
(18.340)
25.808
(18.673)
28.594
(18.717)
PRIVD 19.259
**
(8.951)
17.279**
(9.080)
10.789
(9.517)
11.681
(9.599) PRIVD
20.754**
(9.010)
17.606**
(9.161)
16.127*
(9.763)
15.561*
(9.833)
FOR 63.980
***
(14.398)
65.070***
(14.729)
65.546***
(17.500)
63.234***
(18.148) FOR
68.921***
(13.999)
69.989***
(14.383)
75.542***
(17.415)
69.951***
(18.139)
N -0.001(0.011)
-0.011
(0.012)
-0.011
(0.013) N
0.007
(0.010)
0.006
(0.013)
0.003
(0.013)
PRIVD * N 0.015
***
(0.005)
0.012*
(0.007) PRIVD * N
0.004
(0.007)
0.005
(0.008)
FOR * N 0.003(0.012)
0.008
(0.015) FOR * N
-0.008
(0.012)
0.002
(0.016)
A 0.723
***
(0.171)
0.692***
(0.172)
0.711***
(0.171)
0.696***
(0.172) A
0.754***
(0.173)
0.750***
(0.174)
0.765***
(0.174)
0.750***
(0.174)
valad_N - A 0.050
***
(0.010)
0.054***
(0.011)
0.045***
(0.011)
0.048***
(0.011) prof_N
0.033***
(0.011)
0.040***
(0.011)
0.037***
(0.012)
0.038***
(0.012)
PRIVD *
(valad_N - A)
-0.018
(0.012)
-0.031**
(0.013)
-0.021*
(0.012)
-0.027**
(0.014) PRIVD * prof_N
-0.035***
(0.014)
-0.043***
(0.014)
-0.037***
(0.014)
-0.042***
(0.014)
FOR *
(valad_N - A)
-0.047***
(0.017)
-0.053***
(0.018)
-0.053***
(0.017)
-0.051***
(0.019) FOR * prof_N
-0.075***
(0.017)
-0.072***
(0.019)
-0.079***
(0.018)
-0.072***
(0.020)
N * (valad_N - A) 0.000003(0.00001)
0.00003***
(0.00001)
0.000029*
(0.000015) N * prof_N
-0.000016*
(0.00001)
-0.00001
(0.00002)
-0.00001
(0.00002)
PRIVD * N *
(valad_N - A)
0.00002***
(0.000007)
0.00001
(0.00001)
PRIVD * N *
prof_N
0.000017*
(0.00001)
0.00001
(0.00001)
FOR * N *
(valad_N - A)
0.000001
(0.00001)
-0.00001
(0.00002) FOR * N * prof_N
-0.00002
(0.00002)
-0.00002
(0.00002)
Year 1997 -8.186
***
(2.460)
-8.542***
(2.468)
-8.591***
(2.462)
-8.619***
(2.470) Year 1997
-7.721***
(2.498)
-7.635***
(2.504)
-7.735***
(2.504)
-7.690***
(2.511)
Hausman test 2 (7) =46
2
(11) =40
2
(11) =74
2
(13) =36 Hausman test
2
(7) =116
2
(11) =48
2
(11) =355
2
(13) =31
# Obs. 2040 2040 2040 2040 # Obs. 2040 2040 2040 2040
2R 0.182 0.189 0.190 0.192 2R 0.158 0.166 0.163 0.166
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Hausman test checks for orthogonality of individual effects and other regressors. Standard errors
in parentheses.  
2R = R -sq within.
In Table 5, we calculate the size of the total impact of private ownership on firm-level wages
(using the values of the variables from Table 2). The main conclusion is that ownership effects on
wages differ consistently between ownership regimes. The first two rows refer to the pooled OLS
and the panel estimates using value added as proxy for the firm’s ability-to-pay. From the pooled
OLS estimates, it follows that the strongly negative effect of private domestic ownership on rent
sharing dominates the positive effect of private domestic ownership on the wage intercept, resulting
in a negative total impact of private domestic ownership on wages. On average over all four
specifications, a 1% increase in the fraction of shares held by private domestic owners decreases
                                                                                                                                                                               
representative sample of manufacturing firms, however, we argue that this critique does not apply to our results.
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the average wage by 8 000 leva (in 1995 prices). In contrast, the total impact of foreign ownership
on wages is positive and amounts to 38.784 on average. The multinational wage premium clearly
compensates for the negative effect of foreign ownership on rent sharing. The fixed-effects
estimates are more in line with our expectations: the total effect of private domestic as well as
foreign ownership on wages is positive and highest in absolute value for foreign ownership (on
average over all specifications 6.894 for private domestic ownership and 51.232 for foreign
ownership).
Table 5   Ownership Effects on Wages
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4
PRIVD
w
 FOR
w
 PRIVD
w

w
FOR

 PRIVD
w
 FOR
w
 PRIVD
w
 FOR
w

OLS (valad_N) -11.757 43.831 -10.567 38.512 -5.855 35.327 -4.131 37.464
FE (valad_N) 19.259 51.791 11.025 51.326 -0.035 51.802 -2.673 50.008
fd TSLS (valad_N) -1.317 80.338 -6.617 118.218 -6.050 197.962 -16.438 127.810
OLS (prof_N) -6.147 51.156 -5.711 44.319 -6.428 42.369 -5.537 33.383
FE (prof_N) 12.258 50.715 8.357 52.511 7.145 56.365 5.366 52.473
        
   
   
it it
it it
privd privd*N it privd it t privd*N it t
privd privd*N it privd it privd*N it
it
it
valad_N : PRIVD valad_N valad_N Idem for FOR
prof_N : PRIVD prof_N prof_N Idem for FOR
α α N + γ A γ N A . .
α α N + γ γ N . .
+ - + -
+ +
w
w
  
  
6.3.    Robustness Checks
To test whether the estimation results are robust to the use of different variables and
estimation techniques, two robustness checks are carried out.
The first one is related to the measurement of internal conditions and ownership status.17
Following the empirical literature, we substitute profits per worker for value added per worker.
Next, we define three slightly different samples to investigate whether our results are robust to the
use of discrete instead of continuous shareholding variables.18 More specifically, to test for jump
effects we define the ownership dummies in three different ways. The first option is private
domestic (foreign) ownership in the strictest sense: the dummy PRIVDDUM10 (FORDUM10)
equals 1 if private domestic (foreign) ownership exceeds 10%. The 10% threshold is chosen since it
is an internationally accepted standard (see e.g. Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999; Konings, 2001).
Furthermore, it is the criterion used by the IMF to characterise foreign ownership. Second, we
check for majority shareholding: the dummy PRIVDDUM50 (FORDUM50) equals 1 if private
                                                          
17 Note that for all specifications, the Hausman test rejects the random effects estimator.
18 When we estimate the model using the continuous shareholding variables ranging between zero and one, we assume a linear
relationship between the fraction of shares held by the different owners and the control over the firm. To get rid of this  -arguably strong-
assumption, we use dummies for shareholding to check the robustness of our findings. These results, which are not reported, are
available upon request (for a discussion of the results, see p. 3.18).
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domestic (foreign) ownership is higher than 50%. Third, we define fully-owned private domestic
(foreign) firms as those owned for at least 95% by a private domestic (foreign) shareholder
(dummy PRIVDDUM95 (FORDUM95)).
The second check refers to the estimation method. We check the robustness of the fixed-
effects estimator by applying the first-difference instrumental variables approach.
Including profits per worker, the pooled OLS estimates (right part of Table 3) are very well
in line with the earlier results, except for the last specification. This specification points to a
positive firm size effect on the wage intercept ( Nα ) which is however independent of the firm’s
ownership status. Note that the rent-sharing estimate for state firms is lower than the estimate using
value added. The direct endogeneity bias might be an explanation for this finding. The fixed-effects
estimates using profits per worker are reported in the right part of Table 4. In contrast to the
previous panel results, we find no significant firm size-wage effect. Remarkably, the rent-sharing
coefficient in both private domestic and foreign firms is found to be negative and highest in
absolute value for foreign firms. Table 5, however, shows that the size of the total impact of private
ownership on wages using profits per worker to capture the firm’s internal conditions accords very
well to the one using value added per worker.
The pooled OLS results using discrete shareholding variables correspond strongly to those
using continuous shareholding variables. From the results, it follows that no systematic differences
in the estimates across the various ownership dummy categories can be detected. This suggests that
the degree of private ownership does not affect the previous qualitative conclusions. The results of
the panel estimates using majority shareholding as criterion are very similar to those using
continuous shareholding variables. In contrast, when the 10% threshold is used both the firm size-
wage effect and the negative correlation between private domestic ownership and rent sharing
totally disappear. The estimates using the fully-owned ownership definition suggest that firm size
has no effect on rent sharing.
To correct for possible simultaneity between value added and wages as well as between firm
size and wages and to allow for firm-specific effects, we report the results of the first-difference
instrumental variables procedure in Table 6. The various specifications include the first differences
of all variables. As suggested by Arellano (1989), the instruments are in levels. The 3-period
lagged value of value added combined with the 3-period lagged value of real wages at the firm
level are used as instruments for value added. Firm size is instrumented by its 3-period lagged
value. To check instrument validity, we present the probability values of a chi-square statistic
testing overidentifying restrictions, the Hansen-Sargan test. It is clear that all specifications pass the
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overidentification test. To check the usefulness of the instruments, we have performed F-tests. For
all specifications, the nullity of the instruments in the first-stage regression is rejected.19
In line with the panel estimates, foreign firms pay very high inside wages, followed by
private domestic firms. Specifications 2 and 3 point to a positive effect of firm size on the wage
intercept. In contrast to the panel estimates, however, this effect does not differ across ownership
structure. In line with the panel estimates, the results confirm the existence of crucial differences in
the degree of rent sharing across the various ownership types. Comparing the fixed-effect estimates
(left part of Table 4) with the first-difference TSLS estimates (Table 6) reveals that the extent of
rent sharing in state-owned companies is underestimated using an OLS technique. A rather
unexpected result is that the coefficients on rents in private firms are negative in all
specifications.20 No significant effect from firm size on rent sharing is found in specifications 2 and
3. Specification 4 suggests, however, that workers in large private domestic firms have more
bargaining power than those in small firms. From Table 5, it follows that the first-difference TSLS
estimates result in a negative total effect of private domestic ownership on wages and a strongly
positive effect of foreign ownership on wages.
                                                          
19 For sake of brevity, these test statistics are not reported but are available upon request.
20 A potential explanation for this result may be the limited forecasting power of our instruments. Due to data availability we are forced
to use lags to instrument financial conditions. These instruments, however, are not capturing exogenous demand shocks hitting the
industry. Therefore, this unexpected result might partly be due to weak instrument bias, yielding downward biased insider effects (for a
recent discussion of the issue of weak instruments, see Stock and Yogo, 2002 and Chao and Swanson, 2003).
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Table 6   Wage Equation 1997-1998, dependent variable wage it  - First-difference TSLS
Constant 6.309
*
(3.413)
6.809**
(3.495)
4.968
(4.188)
7.875**
(3.759)
PRIVD 45.622
***
(15.122)
36.432***
(14.779)
43.741***
(18.440)
29.047*
(17.609)
FOR 160.73
***
(28.213)
183.31***
(34.718)
291.58***
(91.314)
205.09***
(79.101)
N 0.066
***
(0.026)
0.053*
(0.030)
0.017
(0.030)
PRIVD * N -0.004(0.019)
0.023
(0.017)
FOR * N -0.109(0.083)
-0.007
(0.076)
A 0.845
***
(0.221)
0.894***
(0.227)
0.960***
(0.246)
0.814***
(0.228)
valad_N - A 0.099
***
(0.024)
0.105***
(0.025)
0.118***
(0.028)
0.096***
(0.027)
PRIVD *
(valad_N - A)
-0.181***
(0.052)
-0.166***
(0.053)
-0.192***
(0.056)
-0.184***
(0.054)
FOR *
(valad_N - A)
-0.310***
(0.065)
-0.251***
(0.066)
-0.361***
(0.075)
-0.298***
(0.078)
N * (valad_N - A) -0.00003(0.00002)
-0.00006
(0.00006)
0.00005
(0.00005)
PRIVD * N *
(valad_N - A)
0.00002
(0.00002)
0.000025*
(0.000015)
FOR * N *
(valad_N - A)
-0.00007
(0.00005)
-0.00005
(0.00005)
Hansen-Sargan
 IV Test
(p-value)
0.834 0.976 0.938 0.328
# Obs. 695 695 695 695
2R . . . .
      ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses. A full stop in the 
2
R box indicates that the calculated
2
R was negative and hence is not reported. Hansen-Sargan Instrument Validity Test: test of correlation among instruments and residuals, asymptotically
    distributed as 
2
 .df  The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid. All variables are in first differences, the instruments are in levels.
7.    CONCLUSION
To conclude, our results clearly show that ownership status is an important determinant of
both the wage intercept and the degree of rent sharing. Rent sharing is very pronounced in state-
owned firms but far less pronounced in private domestic and foreign firms. The results strongly
confirm the existence of a multinational wage premium. In addition, we find weak evidence of a
positive firm size-wage effect and a positive effect of firm size on the degree of rent sharing. If
these effects exist, they are often more pronounced in private domestic firms.
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In our view, the higher technology level of foreign firms and the presence of international rent
sharing are two plausible explanations for the significant multinational wage premium in Bulgaria.
The resulting high wage may prevent insiders in foreign firms from translating productivity gains
into wage increases. This may partly explain the result that the share of rents taken by workers in
foreign companies is considerably less than the part taken by state-owned employees. Another
explanation is that foreign ownership seems to be concentrated in firms with high value added.
Consequently, workers in these firms need to capture only a small fraction of the rents to secure an
acceptable wage. A third possible explanation for the observed differences in rent-sharing
behaviour across ownership categories is that firm mobility may curb insider power. If one thinks
about a two-stage game in which the location decision of foreign firms occurs after firms and
insiders bargain over wages, the ‘threat of relocation’ possibility of foreign firms vis-à-vis the
insiders increases the relative bargaining power of the firm. If bargaining breaks down, the conflict
payoff (or outside option for the firm) is positive as foreign firms can relocate activity to other
countries. This may lead to a low responsiveness of real wages to productivity gains (Zhao, 1995).
The strong positive relationship between firms’ ability-to-pay and wages in state-owned firms
may partly be explained by the fact that insiders in these companies still play an important role.
This is however not a sufficient explanation as increased product market competition (resulting for
example from increased FDI) may prevent insiders from exploiting their power at the bargaining
table. More plausible explanations are the relatively low inside wage level (for given rent sharing)
and the low value-added profile in these firms which may induce (or necessitate) employees to
cream off a considerable part of the rents to obtain an acceptable wage.
Finally, a caveat to our results is the possibility of residual selection bias. It could be that
some categories of owners were able to obtain shares in better firms, in ways which are
unobservable to the researcher but possibly observable to the buyers. This problem arises in all
studies of privatisation and firm performance. In our analysis, we argue that the fixed-effects
estimator controls for ownership endogeneity. This is valid if the unobservable quality is fixed for
each firm. The effect may be dynamic, however, if for example the unobservable quality relates to
potential for restructuring and improvements in productivity rather than being intertemporally
fixed. We implicitly control for this dynamic effect by using the first-difference TSLS method.
Nevertheless, the possibility of selection bias should be borne in mind in interpreting our findings.
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APPENDIX A
Table A.1   Summary Statistics by Ownership Category
VARIABLES # Obs. Total Sample
Mean (St. Dev.)
# Obs. Maj. State
Firms
Mean (St. Dev.)
# Obs. Maj. Priv. Dom.
Firms
Mean (St. Dev.)
# Obs. Maj. Foreign Firms
Mean (St. Dev.)
1997
Employment 1163 400.4  (799.0) 303 528.6  (1398.4) 802 335.0  (390.4) 58 635.3  (553.3)
Average wage 933 101.7  (105.6) 265 98.2  (84.2) 620 100.3  (114.3) 48 137.9  (89.0)
Profits per employee 931 167.3  (595.5) 265 111.5  (396.3) 618 179.1  (667.2) 48 323.8  (495.2)
Value added per employee 931 269.1  (663.3) 265 209.7  (446.5) 618 279.6  (742.0) 48 461.7  (545.8)
1998
Employment 1371 346.8  (695.0) 236 328.5  (609.3) 1058 327.8  (708.5) 77 664.1  (685.7)
Average wage 1102 112.2  (76.7) 211 102.0  (78.0) 828 110.8  (71.5) 63 164.7  (112.2)
Profits per employee 1099 303.4  (3287.5) 211 98.5  (271.5) 827 337.2  (3741.0) 61 553.9  (2153.0)
Value added per employee 1101 415.9  (3289.7) 211 200.6  (304.1) 828 447.6  (3743.2) 62 725.8  (2145.3)
1997-1998
Employment 2534 371.4  (744.8) 539 441.0  (1126.8) 1860 330.9  (592.5) 135 651.7  (630.1)
Average wage 2035 107.4  (91.2) 476 99.9  (81.5) 1448 106.3  (92.4) 111 153.1  (103.2)
Profits per employee 2030 241.0  (2452.7) 476 105.7  (346.3) 1445 269.6  (2863.8) 109 452.6  (1641.7)
Value added per employee 2032 348.7  (2463.3) 476 205.6  (389.5) 1446 375.8  (2874.2) 110 610.5  (1649.7)
Source: Amadeus Database
Note: In Table A1, the sample is restricted to firms which are classified according to majority shareholding. By contrast, the sample in Table 2 also
contains firms which have multiple owners. Consequently, the number of observations in Table A1 differs from the number in Table 2.
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